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1. Introduction
The first part of this work intends to give a general survey of
some theories current in the fields of ontology and mereology dealing
with the well-known problem of whole-parts relations. Some hints about
the philosophical consequences of these positions concerning the problem
of identity will be given. In the conclusive part of the article I will focus
on a specific identity criterion defining the Cartesian notion of substance
in order to distinguish in ontological-formal terms individuals from
objects. More specifically, it seems that the differents notions of pregnant
whole of Husserl’s “Third Logical Investigation” can single out the formal
parthood structure of certain kinds of entities, typically living beings,
from that of material artifacts or objects.
It is well-known that the topic of whole-parts relations is today at
the centre of a lively debate about relationships between metaphysics,
ontology and many applied disciplines such as medical-biological
sciences, cognitive sciences, but also geography, environmental sciences
or software engineering. My research aims at developing some important
issues of the “Third Logical Investigation” named “On The theory of
Wholes and their Parts”, in view of presenting a double type articulated
theory of strong integrated wholes called, respectively, unitary pregnant
wholes and emergent or supervenient pregnant wholes. The former
typically exemplified by living beings or individuals, the latter by
complexes of individual properties called by the Australian philosopher
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Keith Campbell <abstract or dependent particulars>1, as opposed to
<concrete particulars> also known in the tradition as substances or
individuals. Abstract particulars of Campbell are very close to Williams’s
<tropes> and Husserl’s <individual moments>, but many centuries before
Leibniz and Aristotle called them <individual accidents or individual
properties>. Donald Williams (1953) espoused his view in the pioneering
“The Elements of Being” where substances are bundles of tropes related
by a relation of compresence. Campbell following Williams wrote: “an
ordinary object, a concrete particular, is a total group of compresent
tropes or abstract particulars”.2
I will not accept the bundle theory because the relation of
compresence is too weak in order to explain how from a fusion of tropes
we can move to concrete particulars as objects or living beings. Individual
properties seem to be too insubstantial to give rise to substantial
individuals by bundling, that remain - as Peter Simons assumes - a mere
collection and not an individual.3 In my view, bundles of tropes - not
single tropes - are emergent or supervenient pregnant wholes made up
by the Husserlian relation of ontological foundation binding unitarily
every trope. They can be melodies, the laughing of the Mona Lisa,
expressive and affective aspects of anatomical parts as faces, attributes
of objects shape as the pug-nose of  Theaetetus in the famous dialogue of
Plato, or as in an example of Peter Simons, the way Ingrid Bergman asks
Sam to play “As time goes by” in Casablanca, and so on.4 Unitary
pregnant wholes and the emergent wholes - plausibly, living  beings and
complexes of tropes - are radically distincts form each other and from
material artifacts - medium-sized dry goods as in the words of J. L.
Austin, the inanimate things called by Husserl narrow wholes.
2. Extensional Approaches to Whole-Parts Relations
My view also differs from the formal theory of whole known as
classical exstensional mereology which is usually presented in two logical
guises: “The calculus of individuals” of H. Leonard and N. Goodman
and the mereology of Lesniewski.5  Usually in extensional mereologies
no formal ontological differences have been carried out up to now between
individuals and objects. These theories are subject to two major criticisms.
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The first is that it asserts the existence of certain individuals - called
mereological sums - for whose existence we have no evidence outside
the theory itself. The second and more fundamental criticism is that they
do not fit most of the objects around us.
Also in the spirit of analytic philosophy, objects and individuals
have always been conceived like spatiotemporal entities with the same
conditions of identity in a strict sense and across time. For Frege and
Quine individuals and objects both can be in the same way the value of a
logical variable in a predicate calculus. Peter Strawson applies the term
individual to refer to all the conceivable spatiotemporal entities even if
he recognises that the terms individual and object are linguistic
expressions that cannot be synonymous.6
Recently, some theories have been proposed to favor the encounter
between topological disciplines of space and mereological theories like
those mentioned before. Roberto Casati & Achille Varzi in their two books
published by MIT Press, “Holes and Other Superficialities”, 1994, and
“Parts and Places”, 1999, have reformulated many mereological
principles in terms of topological principles that lie behind spatial
representations. Casati & Varzi apply these principles to things conceived
as specific space regions clearly determined by bona fide boundaries
constituted by surfaces or lines. Mereo-topological approaches together
with purely logic-analytical conception of entities cannot in any case
formally distinguish between individuals and objects and also between
wholes like living beings and complexes or bundles of tropes.
The topological attitude does not also offer a well outlined position
on the problem of identity, as to say that this problem is still open to
different solutions. On the contrary, in extensional mereology the identity
of things is given by the strict algebric sum of their actual proper parts.
In classical extensional mereology things are pure aggregates of parts.
The crucial notion of identity of extensional mereology is the claim that
entities with the same parts are identical. This is a thesis developed by
analogy with the extensionality of sets, whereby sets with the same
members are not only identical but also possible. But in spite of the theory
of sets, the notion of identity that we find in mereology is not abstract or
ideal identity - as the identity between two numbers - or the one of
qualitative-material similarity between two things, but it is rather the
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notion of the thisness of a thing as numerical sameness that is at play.
The notion of identity of mereology is not so far from that of tropes
theories. We can trace the philosophical origins of identity notion of the
mereological approach to the philosophy of Leibniz, more precisely in
his super-essentialism where the identity of a thing is given by all its
individual intrinsic non relational properties. This situation is exactly
formulated in his Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles.
If the thesis of mereological essentialism is accepted then two
prima facie big problems need to be accounted for. (1) The first is that
certain things like living beings have clearly different parts at different
times, they are mereologically variable or in flux. We easily see how an
entity with different parts or properties at different times cannot be
identical with the sum of its parts at any time, for then it would be different
from itself across time. (2) The second problem is that some entities in
the world would have had some parts other than those they actually have,
and still be the same entities. In other words, they are not modally rigid
in their parts. If we accept exstensional mereology then no objects could
have had parts other than those they actually have. This claim is called
mereological essentialism and it is usually associated with Chisholm.7
It must be clear that in every essentialist approach and accordingly
to exstensional merelogy, an individual in two different times because of
natural changes in the compositional structure of his parts, could not be
considered the same individual. For instance, if at a certain time t1 the
individual A is composed of the sum of the parts <a + b + c + d + e>, and
at the time t2 the individual A1, temporally continuous with A, is composed
of the parts <a + b + c + d>, we say that the individual designated by the
term A1 cannot be the same as the individual designated by A.
Mereologically they cannot be identical because they have different parts,
and we have then to exclude a relation of identity through time.
2.1 Modal Approaches
The modal approaches try to avoid the many problems of strong
essentialist theories by using a form of weaker essentialism. For example,
this table could have been painted with another colour and it seems
plausible to think that it would be the same table. In the same way, a
person could have undertaken different careers or experiences and still
70  Prajñâ Vihâra
71
be identified as the same individual. However, the crucial problem with
modal approaches is that they do not offer a well defined criterion to
establish when an individual is still the same individual. How far can we
push ourselves in imagining possible worlds populated by individuals
with counterfactual properties? Modal theories are not able to determine
what are the essential properties that an entity could not lose without
becoming another entity with a different individual identity or a specific
identity.  We find here the express acknowledgement that the problem of
identity through time is one to which we cannot offer really satisfying
solutions, as in these claims by Saul Kripke, which do not seem to
encourage to solve identity problems: “in reality adequate conditions,
necessary and sufficient, for the identity that is not a matter of
principle are in any case rare. To tell the truth, mathematics is the
only case that I know in which such conditions are even given in a
possible world. I don’t know conditions of this kind for the identity
of material objects in time, or for people. Everybody knows what
kind of problem we are dealing with. But let’s drop the subject”.8
In modal approaches the identity across time of an individual
must satisfy the more general conditions expressed by the properties of
his genus or species. The general attitude of modal theories about identity
seem to be trapped in what we could call the vicious analytical circle in
as much as they continually refer to the species of the individual to define
what an individual is permanently across time at the level of its individual
identity. To achieve this they usually use a form of mereological
essentialism less restrictive than of extensional mereology to make up
for the lack of theory of individual identity. They start off with a definition
of the individual coinciding with the definition of his natural species or
natural kind establishing his general existential conditions, then they
deduce that his individual identity may persist across time and change if
and only if it continues to satisfy the defining conditions of the species to
which it belongs, if it continues to exist as an exemplification of its species.
But what seems to be defined in reality is nothig but certain conceptual
notions in use in the linguistic community, or rather, certain scientific
notions that are applied to kinds of individual but that cannot describe
the infinitely richer and more complex individual reality. It seems
implausible to think that individual identity could be established simply
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by the fact that an individual was born by the sexual union of a couple of
individuals as in the Kripke’s theory. We are clearly dealing here with
conditions that have some value for the specific identity of an individual
but not for his individual identity.
As soon as the individual identity of a human being is presented
as the same as having a head, a heart, a DNA, etc., it seems necessary
then that the loss of one of these parts invariably provokes the loss of the
individual identity. Following an old mental experiment by Hilary Putnam
we can think instead that an individual could preserve his individual
identity constituted by his physical external features, his character,
personality, memories or abilities, and at the same time this individual
may radically change his specific identity - constituted by his organic
internal structure - into an artificial one. What we usually intend - in a
Lockean sense - as individual or personal identity - memories and
personality, would be maintained even if the specific identity of a human
being would be modified into another one. The paradoxical situation is
that meanwhile extensional mereology shows a too strong theory of the
individual identity and, at the same time, it lacks a theory about conditions
for the specific identity, for the modal theories the situation is exactly the
opposite, where with solely a theory concerning specific conditions they
try to construct a theory for individual identity across time. The unsolved
questions are in what way does an individual remain related to the peculiar
characteristics of his individuality? What exactly are individual identity
and specfic identity, and what from an ontological standpoint differentiates
them from any other identity of a material artifact like an object?
The second objection to modal theories concerns the fact that it
is unclear how to establish what properties could objectively be different
from those in existence. In the modal approach there are no limits for up
to what point we can imagine counterfactuals situations compatible with
the enduring individual identity. This is because a too broad use of
counterfactual situations prevents us from reaching a positive definition
of the individual identity. This difficulty in the modal approach is
determined by the fact that it cannot answer positively to the question on
what is individual identity. At the heart of these theories it is possible to
think that Napoleon would continue to be Napoleon even if he had won
the battle of Waterloo or if he had had a different face, body or another
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personality. This attitude clearly seems to lack an ontological theory of
the parthood structure of an individual as a whole conceivable
independently of its material origins.
2.2 Alternative Approaches
In the contemporary ontological debate we also have theories as
Van Inwagen’s (his main essays are “The Doctrine of Arbitrary
Undetached Parts”, 1981, and “Material Beings”, 1991) that do not
recognize ontological object’s status to material artifacts as tables or
houses. Van Inwagen believes that material artifacts are only a way to
rearrange the furniture of the earth without adding to it. From this point
of view objects are virtual objects having virtual parts bound to each
other by a manifold set of physical forces. There are therefore no tables
no chairs and there are no other artifacts. Artisans do not create, not at
least in the sense causing things to exist. They rearrange objects in space
and make binding relations to begin to hold or to cease between portion
of matter as in the case of the sculptor who chips away at a block of
marble. An example of Van Inwagen’s is the following: “Imagine a desert
and imagine that a regiment of the foreign legion arrives at a certain
location with orders to secure the local caravan. The first thing the
legionnaires do is build a fort. They have brought bulldozers and
they push the sand about with these machines up to building an
aggregate of sand. Have they brought anything - a fort say - into
existence? The reply of Van Inwagen is that they have not brought
even one object into existence, therefore, the fort is in this sense a
virtual object”.9
However, Van Inwagen’s hypothesis seems to be too strong a
solution to the problem of the nature of objects and does not offer new
elements to understand the relationships between the parts of an object
and the object as a whole. From this point of view, a classical dilemma or
puzzle like the one of Theseus’ boat seems to find an apparent solution.
Theseus’ mythical boat, that each year took young people to the island
of Crete to be sacrificed to the Minotaur, was protected by the Athenians
as they from time to time removed any damaged or old pieces and replaced
them with new parts. Let’s suppose that things went on as Thomas Hobbes
told, that is, the damaged planks were being removed and collected to be
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reassembled in the original way. If we imagine that Theseus’ boat have
had every plank substituted, the boat so reconstructed with the old original
planks would appear very similar to the boat at the start of the story.
Which is Theseus’ real boat? The one that plank by plank was put together
and renovated or the one composed only from the old planks taken off
the original boat? The principle of identity based on spatial temporal
continuity suggests that Theseus’ boat is the first - the one that was
renovated plank by plank - but the material and qualitative identity
principle suggests that Theseus’ boat is the second. How do we decide?
Van Inwagen’s solution is that there are no boats and hence there is no
puzzle about the identity of the boats. All that happens in the story is that
the planks are rearranged, brought into contact and separated. But at no
time two or more of these planks compose anything, and no plank is ever
an essential part of anything.
According to the ontological standpoint of Van Inwagen the puzzle
of Theseus’ boat seems to disappear as soon as we stop to think of the
objects as endowed with an intrinsic individual and specific identity. In
other words, a table or a boat are not essentially a table or a boat. They
do not possess a specific ontological structure in the sense that material
artifacts do not properly have parts or essential parts. Only living beings
have truly undetached parts, more precisely, according to Van Inwagen:
“I think that the cells of living beings are made of […] are unitary
things having an entelechy; in this respect they are like men, women,
and dog of which they are parts”.10
As we will see later this position is incompatible with any coherent
mereological counting policy. Van Inwagen is willing to have men, women
and dogs along with their cells and that violates whatever non-redundancy
ontological constraint. I share Van Inwagen’s denial in ascribing an
essential identity to material artifacts but not for his peculiar reasons.
The motivation of this denial should be found, in my view, in the failing
by the objects to satisfy a specific structure of relationships of dependence
between their undetached parts that I will call structure of unitary
foundation determined by mutual relations of existential dependence.
An array of condition that seems satisfied at least by leaving beings.
I think Van Inwagen’s proposal does not actually fit in an
ontological analysis concerning the parthood of wholes but rather a larger
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metaphysical view of the nature of reality in the search for a reply to the
famous question of Quine: What is there in the world? Without saying
anything about how we have to count the entities of the world. The answer
of Van Inwagen is there are nothing but aggregates of atoms but he has to
add immediately that some of these atoms, as in the case of cells or living
beings, are not just merely modalities to rearrange preexistent matter by
physical and chemical forces. We are still far from an ontological theory
able to describe in formal terms the intrinsic difference between artifacts
and living beings. However, if along the line of analytical thought (e.g.
Frege-Quine-Strawson) we find only spato-temporal entities called
indistinct individuals, with Van Inwagen we have another approach which
overcomes those presupposed ontological distinctions between inanimate
things and animate ones. I believe that too much prominence has been
given to the metaphysical question about what there is in the world
solely from a logical standpoint. I think the former Quinean metaphysical
question has brought us to an unwarranted and widespread equivalence
between objects and individuals driven by the search for a most economic
solutions quite often of a reductionist type, deflectionist or eliminativist
in the spirit of the notorious Ockham’s razor: “entia non sunt
multiplicanda praeter necessitatem”.
Now, I would like to come to the problem of counting policies.
To the problem of how many entities we actually have to count as elements
in an inventory of the world. For instance, the strictest case of counting
policy is the atomistic one: <never count an entity that has parts>.
(AV) x is included in an inventory of the world iff x is
mereologically atomic, i.e. has no proper parts.
 Of course this presupposes that the domain be fixed by an
atomistic mereology and that we are actually able to verify that a certain
entity does not have any part. We may choose among various ways of
drawing up an inventory of the world, we can decide to include only the
parts or we can decide to include only the wholes. But once we have
chosen there is no room for double counting. This is called Minimalist
View from Casati & Varzi 12. This view says in short that a very admissible
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way of drawing up an inventory of the world must satisfy a non-
redundancy constraint.
(NRC) If x properly overlaps y and y is included in the inventory
then x is not itself to be included.
This avoids double counting. For instance Michelangelo’s statue
of David or the form of that piece of marble overlaps the block of marble
and its parts then we have to count only one thing, more plausibly David
as Michelangelo’s statue. The (NRC) is an ontological stance that recently
has been challenged by a relevant philosopher of both analytical and
phenomenological provenance, L. R. Baker in her “Persons and Bodies”,
2000. She proposes that Michelangelo’s David and the block of marble
constituting the statue, would be two distinct entities because they differ
at least in their modal properties. Baker’s account has a great interest,
although it seems more plausible to think that to carry out ontological
distinctions between entities in terms of modal properties is not sufficient
to support this proposition. I think this problem about the possibility of
an ontological subsistence of coincident or superposed things, as the
relation between an object’s shape and its matter might well be solved by
appealing to the Husserlian notion of ontological foundation instead of
Baker’s account, which distinguishes among different kinds of pregnant
wholes, a few of which are complexes of properties ontologically founded
upon wholes.
We can see a few passages of Baker’s essay: “The nature and
identity of many of the things that populate the world of everyday
life are not always or even  usually, determined by what they are
made of […] Our experience of things going out of existence leads
to the conclusion that a statue is not identical to a piece of marble,
nor is a stone wall identical to the stones that make it up, nor are
persons identical to their body. But if a statue is not identical to a
piece of marble, nor a person to a body, what is the relation between
statue and piece or between person and body? This query motivates
development of the idea of constitution-without-identity […]
Constitution is a contingent relation between individuals things. The
relata of the constitution relation are not properties, so constitution
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must be distinguished sharply from supervenience”.11 >> (Baker,
2000: 24-33)
According to Baker, rightly I think, to understand a thing whose
identity is not determined by the identity of its parts we need to look
beyond mereology. The relation of constitution is ubiquitous and, in
Baker’s view, is the relation that is obtained, for instance, between an
octagonal piece of  metal  and a Stop sign, between strands of DNA
molecules and genes or between pieces of paper and dollar bills. It is a
relation of unity that is intermediate between identity and separate
existence. However, the idea of such an intermediate position strikes many
philosophers as incoherent. Here are some more passages of Baker: “If
David and the piece of marble were identical than by a version of
Leibniz’s Law there would be no property borne by the piece of marble
but not borne by David and no properties borne by David but not
borne by the piece of marble […] But we know that the piece of marble
could have existed in a world without art. By contrast, David could
not exist without being a statue. So, David has a property - the property
of being a statue wherever it exists - that the piece of marble lacks
[…] If x constitutes y at a certain place and time, then there is a
unified individual at that place at that time, and the identity of that
individual is determined by y. The identity of the constituting thing is
submerged in the identity of what it constitutes”.12
David and the piece of marble differ in their modal properties
and hence are not identical. Baker clearly admits that David overlaps the
piece of marble when she said <that the constituting thing is
submerged...>. What happens is that Baker’s account escapes not only
from the application of the non redundancy constraint (NRC) but also
from a metodological more general principle that we have called the
Minimalist view. The (MV) says that:
(MV) x is included in an inventory of a world iff x does not overlap
(at the time when the inventory is drawn up) any distinct y that is itself
included in the inventory.
In my opinion, also a strong criticism of extensional mereology
cannot avoid meeting some very general mereological principles as the
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MV. I think we have to regard the (MV) as a postulate: any inventory of
the world must satisfy (MV). The mereology concerned with the problem
of the counting policies has been called countermereology. A way of
implementing one particular instance of the minimalist view is the one
that is obtained by including in an inventory of the world only things
completely demarcated by bona fide boundaries. A bona fide boundary
is a real physical discontinuity in the world between two distinct entities,
as a river between two lands, the surface of an object or the epidermis of
a human being. A fiat or unreal boundary is for instance the border between
France and Italy or Thailand and Myanmar. The (MV) and (NRC) playing
a central role in what we might call the Normal View:
(NV) x is included in an inventory of the world iff it is strongly
self-connected in at least two possible ways, (1) x is constituted with
bona fide  boundaries, (2) x is strongly self-connected relative to some
condition φ.  We says that x is self-connected, i. e. in one piece, iff any
two regions that make up x are connected to each other.13
According to the condition (1) of the (NV) we count as entities
of the world only things bordered by bona fide boundaries. For instance,
if the right parts and the left parts of the top surface of a table seem
delimited by fiat boundaries then we should count only one thing, the top
of the table. However, the various pieces of the table, its tops, its legs etc.
are actually pretty visible. We can state then they are real undetached not
potential parts of the whole either from a purely mereological point of
view or from Husserlian wholes conception. Accordingly, these parts are
solely potential wholes, potential unities, that could become real wholes
just in case they could be made independent and detached from the table.
In that case, the parts qua detached parts become in spatial terms
independent wholes provided that they have bona fide boundaries. If the
condition (1) of (NV), the condition of having bona fide boundaries is
respected then the (NV) is statisfied.
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3. The Role of the Relations of Dependence
I think the way in which Casati & Varzi have exposed the (NV)
states - at least for me - that the two conditions must be mutually exclusives
and then we have two possible ways to satisfy the (NV). This clearly
means that the (NV) could admit two ontological kinds of entities. The
second condition of (NV) admits the central role of identity conditions in
an inventory of the world but depending on the kind of unity between the
parts of an entity. An example of unity satisfying the second condition of
the (NV) is the following case. We easily see how a table is endowed
with a functional identity that it is non constituted by, in the sense that it
doesn’t contain immediately, any real material part of the table. The table’s
functional identity is a kind of unity ontologically founded on a
determined spatial and functional arrangement of some material parts.
Nevertheless, the functional identity does not contain these material parts,
on which it is founded, as proper parts of the functional identity. In this
sense, the table’s functional identity can endure over time and over any
alteration or change of the constituent parts of the table. We count one
thing - a table - until its functional identity is respected. We also see how
the material parts of the table are completely independent from each other
in terms of their existential conditions. Every part of the table exists
independently from the other parts. This means that the table really exists
only as the table’s functional identity but not as a table-material-object.
In this last case we have an extrinsic aggregate. Then we can conclude
that the table as a material artifact is not essentially a table but only an
aggregate of matter while a functional identity is esssentially a table’s
functional identity. We will see that also living beings are essentially
what they are but not as functional entities. From the standpoint of Baker’s
theory there are two distinct entities: the object with a table-shape that
submerges a second object constituted by a piece of matter. In Van
Inwagen’s theory the table is a virtual object, just matter arranged in a
certain way.
I’m deeply persuaded that the Husserlian notion of unitary
ontological foundation can better describe lots of important phenomena
concerning the constitution of unities. Let’s think for instance of a colour
that to exist it must be founded on a spatial surface but without containing
Carlo Conni  79
80
that surface as its part. In the same way the table’s functional identity
does not actually contain the material parts of the table. It’s worth noticing
in the case of the table’s functional identity the condition (2) of (NV)
has been satisfied. Yet it seems also clear that here we have an ontological
dependence between the table’s functional identity and the formal
arrangement of the spatial parts composing the table. We can see how
these spatial or material parts of the table are completely independent for
each other in terms of their existential conditions. Every part of the table
exists independently from the other parts. This means from an ontological
point of view that the table really exists only as the table’s functional
identity but not as a table-material-objects. The functional identity of the
table ontologically depends on some determined φ condition but the
existence of the table or the existence of its material parts does not depend
on each other in any sense. We have here an extrinsic aggregate.
We have seen before that topological unity can only be one of the
various kinds of unity or ontological glue that can be appealed to in
singling out a whole. Homogeneity, causal unity, functional unity,
teleological unity are all quite relevant. There are of course many other
senses in which we may speak of individual integrity besides the sense of
topological connectednees. This was a central intuition of Aristotle. For
Aristotle spatial continuity was only one kind of ontological glue with
rigidity, uniformity and qualitative similarity (Metaphysics, Delta, 6,
1016a). And the same intuition is to be found in Husserl’s Third Logical
Investigation which may be regarded as the first thorough formulation
of a theory of parts and wholes based on the notion of ontological
dependence.
To perform a criterion to distinguish individuals and objects on
purely ontological basis we need some specific ontological instruments.
This criterion lies on the possibility to determine the nature of a few
relations of dependence between the parts of a whole and the whole but
not in terms of spatial connectednees. Before introducing the criterion it
can be useful to see how in the extensional approach the problem of
existential dependence relations between parts has never had relevance.
We have seen that real entities are simply spatial aggregates of some
type of matter, and spatial connectedness is the only ontological glue.
On this mereo-topological account the fundamental primitive is not
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parthood but connection and all the mereological notions are introduced
via the following part definition:
(PD) x is a part of y if and only if everything that is connected to
x is also connected to y.
In one direction this principle is obvious: the leg is part of the
table only if everything is connected to the leg is connected to the table.
If we interpret it as an overlap of parts then (PD) is certainly viable. It
expresses a basic mereological fact: one thing is part of another just in
case whatever overlaps the first overlaps the second.
On this basis and barring for the moment the complications arising
from intensional factors such as time, modalities and counterfactuals, let
us review some mereo-topological principles in the order of increasing
strength and consequence. Most theories agree on some common ground,
treating parthood as a reflexive, antisymmetric, transitive relation. In a
formal way we have the following representation of parthood axioms:
(PA)
            (reflexivity)       Pxx
Everything is a part of himself
            (antisymmetry)  Pxy ∧ Pyx → x = y
Two distinct things cannot be part of each other
If x is a part of y and y is a part of x then x = y
(transitivity)      Pxy ∧ Pyz → Pxz
If x is a part of y and y a part of z then x is a part of z
Any part of any part of a thing is itself part of that thing
We also add the principle of Proper Part:
PPxy = df  Pxy ∧ ¬ Pyx
x is a proper part of y iff x is a part of y and y is not a part of x.
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The crucial point is that this axiomatisation needs to be completed
by an approach in terms of relations of ontological dependence. In
particular, Rescher (1955)14 and several other authors do not recognise
the validity of the transitivity relation, the case in (c). In military usage,
for example, a person can be part of small units which are parts of larger
ones, but people are never part of large units. A part of a cell is not said to
be a part of the organ of which that cell is a part. Casati & Varzi minimize
on these counterexamples but we can see as transitivity is a general
principle which is meant to apply to parts only spatially broadly
understood. A soldier is directly part of a battalion but the soldier does
not report to the head of the battalion. Likewise, a handle is a functional
part of a door, the door is a functional part of the house and yet the
handle is not a functional part of the house. These examples involve a
departure from the broader notion of parthood that mereo-topology is
meant to capture.
To understand the manifold parthood phenomena we have to recur
to the Husserlian ontological foundation or existential dependence.
Husserl pointed out two types of ontological glue between parts and
wholes. A narrow whole as a material artifact is one in which a number
of entities are bound together into a unity by means of which Husserl
calls unifying moments, in other terms, spatio-temporal relations of
contiguity or something like that. While in a unitary pregnant whole the
parts are bound by existential or ontological relations of foundation and
dependence.
We have to thank the seminal work of the Manchester triad - K.
Mulligan, B. Smith and P. Simons - on the notion of ontological
dependence, if inquiries on this topic have received a deeper development
in the 80’s. The new bible of an ontology not merely exstensional is the
text of P. Simons, “Parts”, 1987. Another very important work is the
study on the “Third Logical Investigation, “Parts and Moments. Studies
in Logic and Formal Ontology”, edited by B. Smith and K. Mulligan,
1982. My inquiring into dependence relations between parts and wholes
starts from these studies also to point out some of their intrinsic limits,
above all the fact that they have not shown the ontological potentialities
of the Husserlian notion of unitary foundation in its two variants.
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The key notion we have to work is then that of ontological
dependence. We have many types of dependence relations but only some
of them can play a central role in explaining the structure of an individual.
The concept of dependence is a form of connection between entities that
may be variously filled out. To try to find a common thread running
through various notions of dependence we may appeal to the following
list of definitions by P. Simons:
1. Person A is financially dependent on person B iff A cannot be
solvent unless B is solvent (financial dependence).
2. Skill A is dependent on skill B iff A cannot be mastered unless
B is mastered (practical dependence).
3. Judgement A <the roses are red> is dependent on the
representation or idea B of the roses iff A cannot occur to a person C
unless B occurs in that person (Brentanian psychological dependence).
4. Person A is dependent on drug B iff A cannot survive unless
doses of B are regularly dispensed (physiological dependence).
5. An organic part A of a living being C is dependent on an
organic part B of C iff A does not exercise its functions without the function
of B (biological dependence).
6. A living being A is dependent on a set B of internal biological
conditions or on a set C of outside environmental conditions iff A does
not exist unless B and C exist (existential dependence).
7. Clause A of a contract is dependent on clasue B iff A cannot
apply unless B applies (legal dependence).
8. Proposition P is dependent on proposition Q iff P cannot be
true unless Q is true (one form of logical or semantic dependence).
9. Accident or property A (e.g. this whiteness) is dependent on
object B (e.g. a piece of paper) iff A cannot exist unless B exists
(ontological dependence or De Re dependence).15
            This list could obviously be much longer.
4. The Ontological Core of the Third Logical Investigation
Here are the basic definitions of ontological foundation also called
existential or ontological dependence. The usserlian definition of
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ontological foundation stated in the Third Logical Investigation is the
following:
(HDOF) “A content of the species α is founded on a content of
the species β iff an α cannot exist, for its essence (that is by law, on the
basis of its specific nature), without the existence of a content of the
species β (III LU, § 21)”.16
We can easily see how Husserl insists on defining the relation of
foundation making appeal to the specific nature, to the specific identity
of the contents embraced in the relation. The definition most simply
affirms that an α is founded on a β iff it cannot exist without a β. The
classical example of Husserl is that of the colours that cannot exist without
a bearer as the surface of an object. We have then a formal definition of
the existential dependence relation in terms of parthood. This is a reading
that has been shown to be true of Husserlian definition of ontological
foundation. The relation of foundation is a specific parthood pattern:
(EDD)  A f B → (¬ (B < A) ∧ (A < B))
We read the definition as: if A is founded (or A is existentially
dependent) on B then B is not a part of A but A is a proper part of B. It is
by means of the existential dependence relation that Husserl defines the
notion of unitary ontological foundation. It is the unitary fondation that
can be the relevant candidate to satisfy the phi-condition of the (NV) and
to capture a large number of phenomena that we cannot explain in terms
of pure topological relations.
The relevant class of suitable candidates to satisfy the φ condition
will be those of living beings or more generally the class of substances
here represented by pregnant wholes. To Husserl, the pregnant concept
of a whole goes beyond the one of an arbitrary mereological aggregate
endowed with bona fide boundaries and calls for an account in terms of
the two concepts of unitary ontological foundation. The Husserlian
general definition of unitary ontological foundation is the following:
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(HDUOF)  “We understand by a pregnant whole a range of
contents which are all covered by a single and unitary foundation without
the help of further contents. The contents of such a range are called its
parts. By talking of the unitarity of the foundation we imply that every
content is foundationally dependent,  directly or indirectly, with every
content. This can happen in such a way that all those contents are founded
on each other, directly or indirectly, without any external recourse” (III
LU: § 21).
The definition affirms that a unitary pregnant whole is a strongly
connected network of parts whose existence depends on the existence of
the other parts. All the relations between the parts are relations of
existential dependence in a strong sense of existence like coming into
existence, survival or enduring.  In my doctoral dissertation I have argued
that in the § 21 of the Third Logical Investigation it is actually defined
another complementary definition of unitary foundation. It is the following
that I call unitary emergent foundation:
(HDUEF) “…this can happen in such a way that all those contents
are founded on each other, directly or indirectly, without any external
recourse; or inversely they all together found a new content, still without
any external recourse. In this last case this new unitary content will be
constituted by part-contents which will be founded on part-groups of the
whole presupposed system of contents” (III LU: § 21), the italics are by
Husserl himself.
An emergent property is such a property that emerges from a
whole of more basic properties or constituents. Emergent properties are
exclusively properties of a whole. Husserl adds this important
specification: “We note immediately that differences of this type
determine essential distinctions between wholes. In the first cases
the parts are in foundational relations […] in the others the parts are
external to one another and determine real forms of connections.
When we talk about connections we have to intend a narrow sense of
whole where certain contents are independent of each other” (III
LU: § 21).
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It would take too long for me to enter into the details of the Husserl
definition of emergent unitary foundation but it is important to notice
how these passages of Husserl are essential to understand the innovative
strength of his ontology. The narrow wholes that Husserl mentions are
clearly material artifacts, pure extensive contents unified by real forms
of connections, while pregnant wholes can only be living beings or, still
hypothetically - functional forms or perhaps, complex digital systems,
where the existence of any software part depends on the existence of
other parts. I think that the two definitions disclose two distinct types of
pregnant wholes that we have called unitary pregnant wholes and
emergent or supervenient pregnant wholes. Now, what are the new
contents described in the Husserlian definition of (HDUEF)? I think this
definition could refer to complexes of individual properties or complexes
of tropes but also, in a very interesting way, to objects’s shape or spatial
configurations of parts as this passage of Husserl seems to suggest:
“certain independent contents each from the other, (in which a whole
can be divided into its pieces or fractions) found new contents as
“forms of connection between them”” (III LU, § 21).
If the property of an object’s shape, for instance the property to
be round or square, is an emergent property then we could explain why
we can say of many forms that they are nearly round or nearly square
without actually being round or square. This is because the geometrical
character of a form is never contained in its singular parts or in a particular
set of its parts but only in the more comprehensive whole constituted by
all the single spatial and geometrical aspects of the shape.
5. The Notion of Substance
My hypothesis about ontological differences between individuals
and objects and the nature of specific identity are then the following.
Full-fledged livings beings are unitary pregnant wholes because every
organic part of these beings is, directly or indirectly, in a relation of
existential dependence on the other parts of the whole. All parts depend
on each other and the whole is not a simply sum of its parts. The network
of existential dependences implemented in living beings is a recognizable
pattern representing their specific identity. Every kind of living being
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detains his specific pattern of unitary foundation made up by a specific
network of all his parts in relations of existential dependence. We define
in the following way the notion of specific identity of an individual:
(SID) An entity is an individual in an essential way iff it shows a
specific identity. An entity holds a specific identity iff it is a unitary
pregnant whole resulting from a unitary ontological foundation. Specific
identity (SI) is a case of (HDUOF).
By means of (HDUOF) we obtain a systemic definition of the
specific identity of an individual in terms of the complexity of its structure.
An entity is an individual if and only if all of its parts are one another in
relations of existential dependence. This means that the living organic
structure of individuals is such that we have a continuous interdependence,
either functional or existential, between their parts. We easily see how an
object cannot in any sense satisfy this ontological pattern. An object, in
as much as it is a narrow whole, constituted by relations of spatial
connection like contiguity between its parts cannot show a specific
identity.
I believe that the Husserlian definition of unitary foundation
(HDUOF) together with his notion of pregnant whole can offer us a
fundamental tool to explain in formal terms the Cartesian notion of
substance. An entity is a substance if it matches the definition of unitary
pregnant whole. R. Descartes in his Principles of Philosophy defined the
notion of substance in this way:
(CDS) <lorsque nous concevons la substance nous concevons
seulement une chose qui existe en telle façon qu’elle n’a besoin que
de soi-même pour exister> (I. 51). <by substance we can understand
nothing other than a thing  which exists in such a way as to depend on no
other thing for its existence> (eng. trans. J. Cottingham, 1985)
The notion of substance has been traditionally identified with
concrete particulars, however, so doing the necessary condition of
ontological independence has been reinterpreted in such a way as spatial
separate existence of an entity from all the others. It is evident that concrete
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particulars are not ontologically independent - all things are in some
way existentially dependent entities - but at least some of them are
spatially separated from others by bona fide boundaries. As the Cartesian
definition stands, it should be clear that no entity could plausibly satisfy
it. There are actuallly no absolutely independent entities, only God could
plausibly being ontologically independent or perhaps the Prime
Immovable Motor of Aristotle that turns all the celestial spheres. In any
case, we woudn’t have ordinary candidates for this notion.
Husserlian definition of unitary foundation can offer the right
solution in the spirit of Cartesian definition. Until we think about
individuals in topological or mereological terms as aggregates of parts,
we’ll have no solution because the existence of these type of entities
depend upon their proper parts, but the parts of an object cannot actually
depend on the whole object itself. The existence of the table depends on
the existence of its proper parts - and this is a trivial truth - but these parts
are existentially completely independent from one another and also from
the table itself as a whole. The relations of dependence inside material
artifacts are therefore only in one direction, from the object to its parts.
We have now to prove that an individual, differently from an
object, does not properly depend on its proper parts in only one direction,
and this is not a difficult task to achieve. If it is true that the existence or
the functionality of every organic part of a living being depends on some
other functional parts it is also true that all single parts of a living being
cannot exist without the whole individual itself. To better understand
this point we can think of the embryo that comes into existence almost
complete with his essential parts. If the existence of the whole depends
on its part, at the same time the single parts could not come into existence
without the integral whole. My organic parts never could come into
existence without the whole of my body that I am.
We can now state that if the existence of a whole depends on its
proper parts and in turn the existence of the proper parts depends on the
whole, then this type of whole is a thing which exists in such a way as to
depend on no other things for its existence. The whole depends on itself.
The ontological independence of the substance is not a matter of absolutely
existential independence but it is determined by an interdependent
structural network of mutual relations of dependence between the whole
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and its parts. At the § 10 Husserl wrote: “establish the concept of
dependence it is sufficient to affirm that an object can be dependent
(in terms of its essential determinations) only inside a more
comprehensive whole” (III LU, § 10). In this sense the relavant
ontological relations of dependence are inside a whole. The existential
dependence of the part upon the whole is then essential in understanding
the notion of substance. We can have the following definition of substance:
(SD) If an entity has a specific identity it is a substance. A
substance is a whole constituted by means of a unitary ontological
foundation if: (a) the existence of every part depends on the existence of
the other parts, (b) the existence of the whole depends on its parts, (c) the
existence of all single parts of the whole depend on the existence of the
whole itself.
In a pure topological conception of entities we cannot understand
the essential dependence of the parts on the whole to which they belong.
and we could not satisfy the (2) condition of the (NV). I think this is the
deep ontological intent of Husserl’s work when he introduces the notion
of ontological foundation as the genuine ontological glue between parts
of pregnant wholes. Within this ontological frame we have for example a
new way to look at the puzzle of Theseus’ boat. The boat exists only as a
whole with certain specific properties. Its existence depends obviously
on its parts but the existence of the planks of the boat never depends on
the other parts nor on the whole itself. The boat then is not a substance, it
doesn’t have a specific identity. At any time Theseus’ boat has proper
parts constituted by its planks but no intrinsic relation of dependence
between these parts and the boat subsists, and then any replacement of
planks is admissible. Temporal continuity is then plausibly the right
identity criterion for the boat.
I think with the Husserlian notion of unitary ontological
foundation we have seen not only a useful tool to formally distinguish
between individuals and objects but also a very meaningful way of
describing one of the essential aspects of the phenomenon of life: his
intrinsic systemic interdependence of his properties. I believe that the
ontological view I have developed from Husserlian ontology can fruitfully
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meet the science of complex systems also now called the science of life.
On this point, I’d like to quote a few passages of F. Capra that clearly
illustrate the relevance of the relations between wholes and parts for the
understanding of living systems: “The essential properties of an
organism, or living system, are properties of the whole, which none
of the parts have. These properties are destroyed when the system is
dissected, either physically or theoretically, into isolated elements.
Although we can discern individual parts in any system, these parts
are not isolated and the nature of the whole is always different from
the mere sum of its parts […] System sciences show that living systems
cannot be understood by analysis. The properties of the parts are not
intrinsic properties but can be understood only within the context of
the larger whole”.17
Now I’d like to sketch very briefly a notion of individual identity
as an instantiation of an emergent pregnant whole. We cannot deepen the
wide phenomenon of individual identity for which I advance an articulated
theory in terms of emergent properties. Here is my definition of  individual
identity:
(IID) Individual identity is the set of properties of an individual
that are constituted by means of (HDUEF). The real properties of an
individual identity must be properties of the whole individual. Emergent
properties can fit this requirement because - in the spirit of Husserlian
definition - they have to emerge from the whole individual.
As to say, from the whole relevant set of more basic properties
belonging to the proper parts of the individual. Emergent properties
are then essential properties because the whole individual cannot persist
as the same individual without these properties. Emergent properties show
a typical character to the effect that they do not contain the parts on
which they are unitary ontologically founded. In this way, they can persist
across time in the case of an individual changing or losing a few of its
parts. The organic and anatomic parts upon which emergent properties
are founded are not constitutive parts of the emergent properties. I quote
an example. If the typical way in which John expresses his sadness is an
affective expression on his face, founded on some anatomic and physical
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parts of John’s face, then the parts of this affective expression of sadness
are not the parts of his face, and vice versa. In this way, probably, we
could think that mental contents are unitarily ontologically founded on
neurophysiological states but without containing the parts and properties
of these states as proper parts of the mental contents itself. The parts of a
neurophysiological state cannot play any explicative role with regard to
a mental content.
Why don’t we think then that the thought is a property founded
in some psycho-physical state and in this sense it points out to us the
existence of a situation where the thought can play the role of a part, but
not the contrary, the more basic states are not parts of the thought as in
(EDD)? Probably the relations of ontological foundation best deeply
represent the spirit of the Cartesian’s dualism of the cogito ergo sum,
where if I think certainly my thinking is a part of a more comprehensive
whole constituted by my bodily existence, but the existence in itself is
not an evidence of thinking. If this is true then the thought and its
conceptual content is not a proper part of anything but rather an emergent
property of a whole, more specifically, an improper part as well as all the
other emergent properties. We can formulate the following definition of
improper part:
(IPD) x is an improper part of y iff x is EUF on y and  ¬ (x < y)
∧ (y < x)
The mental and conceptual contents are not something personal
that exclusively belong to us but rather something that can be objectively
shared in a community of persons just because of its emergent character.
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